[Aztlan] Kennewick Man
Bertram Perkel
bperkel29 at comcast.net
Thu May 4 20:58:00 CDT 2006
Bertram Perkel
On May 4, 2006, at 5:44 PM, Michael Finley
> Despite Betram's comment, I have say, as a lawyer, that there are
> often two sides to questions of statutory interpretation! However, the
> appellate decision in the Kennewick Man case is about as clear as this
> sort of thing gets. The ambiguities pointed out by Margarita do not
> seem to me to be grave (no pun intended) difficulties.
>
> The decision is based on interpretation of NAGPRA, and more
> specifically, on a finding that the Secretary of the Interior erred in
> interpreting NAGPRA. This finding then allowed the court to apply the
> correct interpretation to the evidence that had been presented in
> earlier proceedings. The apparently limited jurisdiction of the
> appeal court to questions of law is more apparent than real in cases
> like this, because once error is law is found, the evidence can be
> considered.
> The principal legal finding is that NAGPRA defines Native American
> human remains to mean human remains that are "of or related to" a
> "presently existing tribe, culture, or people that is indigenous to
> the US." The Secretary erred in bringing all pre-contact remains
> within the definition.
> Equally imprtant, the court did try to give some guidance in
> determining "what kind" and "how strong" a "relationship" with a
> presently existing tribe is required. It noted that the purpose of
> the rule is to respect burial customs of modern-day tribes and accord
> dignity to the remains of ancestors of modern-day peoples. In a
> straightforward case, say 19th C. Lakota human remains, there is no
> problem. The idea of "relationship" comes into play to extend the
> scope of the rule to ancestors of present tribes. Although the court
> does not say so in so many words, it implies that if a relationship is
> strong enough to make interference with the remains disrespectful to
> putative genetic or cultural decendants, NAGPRA applies. This will of
> course be a matter of judgment in individual cases: If respect is the
> key notion, it is hard to be more specific, but the notion is not
> open-ended, and the court was clear that age alone is not enough, nor
> is geography.
>
> In addition, the court's handling of the evidence suggests some
> highly relevant considerations. It found that, as a threshold
> requirement, there must be genetic or cultural continuity between the
> remains and a present day tribe. In this case, because cultures
> of modern tribes in the area cannot be traced back more than 5000
> years, less than the apparent age of Kennewick Man, and because of the
> genetic uniqueness of the remains, the relationship could not be
> established. The court did not rule out oral history as a means of
> demonstrating relationship, but took the position that oral history
> must provide some specific evidence of relationship (not, for
> example, "we have always lived here," or in this case, "oral history
> tells of no previous inhabitants."), and, I think it is fair to say,
> the court suggested that oral history is strong evidence only if
> corroborated by other evidence, such as archeology.
>
> The court also clearly implied that preliminary investigation of
> remains is required to determine if NAGPRA applies. Obviously, the
> affiliation of remains will be clear almost as soon as they are
> unearthed in many cases. But if a tribe asserts control over remains,
> its claim must stand or fall on available evidence, and if it attempts
> to restrict investigation in difficult cases, it risks an adverse
> finding because there may not be enough obvious evidence to establish
> a relationship. In this case, the court noted quite deliberately (I
> think) that there was scanty evidence because of limited
> investigation, and thus little to erect an argument of relationship to
> the claimants. While this falls short of technically placing the
> legal burden of proof on the tribe asserting a relationship, it
> suggests a practical or evidentary burden that must be met by the
> claimants.
>
>
> Of course, in some respects Kennewick Man was actually an easy case
> because of his great age and genetic uniqueness. Applying the
> Court's logic to say, the Mound Builders or the Anasazi is obviously
> more difficult. In the hard cases, I'd suggest that disputes between
> archaeologists about cultural history, and interpretation of oral
> histories will be the problem areas. Quaere: Would a marked change
> in burial customs break the relationship on grounds that what is
> now regarded as disrepectful was not so regarded by the ancestors?
>
>
> Michael Finley
>
>
> Margarita B. Marin-Dale wrote:
>
>> Marcelo, Clifford, and Listeros,
>> First of all, I believe the court decisions in the case of the
>> study of Kennewick Man probably reached the correct outcome: it would
>> have been a travesty for the scientific community not to be able to
>> analyze such an important archaeological find that had the potential
>> of shedding additional light on the origin of the Native peoples of
>> the Americas. However, as a follow-up to Clifford and Marcelo's
>> discussion on the standard of proof (whether genetic or cultural) in
>> the case of Kennewick Man, it seems to me that the standard set forth
>> by the appellate court is somewhat unclear and leaves a number of
>> open questions. For example:
>> 1. What must Native Americans do to prove that ancient human
>> remains are "substantially related to a pre-existing Native American
>> tribe, people, or culture of the U.S.?" (The standard established by
>> the appellate court in the case of Kennewick Man.)
>> 2. And, if scientific analysis is required to prove substantial
>> relationship, in order to satisfy the requirements of question #2,
>> doesn't that, in fact, contravene the purpose or purposes of the
>> NAGPR, and possibly other laws, which aim to protect the social and
>> religious traditions -- including burial traditions -- of Native
>> Americans, many of which prohibit tampering with human remains of any
>> kind?
>> As many of you know, the jurisdiction of appellate courts in the
>> U.S. only extends to questions of law, and not questions of fact, so
>> the most important question before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
>> in the Kennewick Man case was whether the Secretary of the Interior's
>> decision to transfer Kennewick Man to the Tribal Claimants arbitrary
>> and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
>> accordance with law? (If yes, then the court would have to set aside
>> the Secretary's determination to transfer the remains to the Tribal
>> Claimants and affirm the decision of the lower court.) With
>> respect to this question, the Secretary of the Interior had argued
>> that Kennewick Man was a "Native American" under the meaning of the
>> NAGPR because the remains were "of, or relating to, a tribe, people,
>> or culture that is indigenous to the United States." To reach this
>> determination, the Secretary relied on the age of the remains, and
>> the fact that the remains were geographically found in the United
>> States. The Secretary had also stated that a "preponderance of the
>> evidence" showed that Kennewick Man was "culturally affiliated" with
>> present-day Indian tribes.
>> The appellate court, however, determined that the Tribal Claimants
>> had shown NO relationship between Kennewick Man and their tribes, and
>> thus, the lower court was correct in its determination that NAGPR did
>> not apply. (Opinion, p. 21) It held that in order for the NAGPR to
>> be triggered in this case, the record had to prove that the human
>> remains "bear some relationship to a presently-existing tribe,
>> people, or culture," of the U.S. (Opinion, p. 19) Elsewhere in the
>> opinion, the court stated a somewhat higher standard -- that the
>> NAGPR required that "human remains bear a significant relationship to
>> a presently-existing tribe, people, or culture to be considered
>> Native American," and affirmed the decision of the lower court.
>> (Opinion, p. 22) However, the court did not supply any information
>> as to how such significant relationship might be proven. The
>> court also argued that the age of the remains alone could not be
>> determinative, because in such a case, all remains predating the
>> European arrival would be "presumptively" Native American, even if
>> such a tribe were extinct and/or had no relationship to any existing
>> Native American tribe. It also argued that geography alone could not
>> be determinative, because in that case, any remains found in the U.S.
>> would automatically be categorized as "Native American" under the
>> meaning of the Act. (The court contrasted the provisions of the
>> NAGPR with those of the "Native Hawaiian" statute, which required a
>> Native Hawaiian to be a descendant of "the aboriginal people, who
>> prior to 1778, occupied and exercised sovereignty in the area that
>> now constitutes Hawaii." In the case of the Hawaiian statute, it
>> argued, that Congress designated a specific geographic area to which
>> the statute would apply.)
>> A copy of the full opinion of the appellate court may be found at:
>>
>> http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/
>> AAFB80F54839DD2D88256E300069CF95/$file/0235994.pdf?openelement
>> Any thoughts?
>> Margarita B. Marin-Dale
>> American University
>>
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