The Redención del Campesino Valley Archaeological Survey

Landscape and Political Geography

In his doctoral dissertation Aliphat concluded that for the Upper Usumacinta region site location and the definition of boundaries between socio-political systems were aspects intrinsically related to the physical landscape (Aliphat 1994:13). In relation to the former Hammond (1975) identified the interaction of two factors that influence settlement location; these are the tactical and the strategic factors. The tactical factors are those local and environmental factors, which influence the decision to establish a settlement, such as access to natural resources (e.g., good agricultural soils, water, flint or obsidian, etc.). The strategic factors on the other hand, are extra local, and are linked to the relationships between settlements, and as it is argued here, they played an important role in the establishment and definition of the center’s territorial extent.

From the outset, this research project has stressed that the location of the most important centers that were subsidiary to Pomoná or Piedras Negras was determined largely by the strategic considerations outlined above. The location of these subsidiary sites and the attention given to the local rulers by their overlords are an indication that indeed, the territorial integrity of their polities and the maintenance of its boundaries constituted a high priority for the Maya kings.

Piedras Negras Stela 12 and La Mar Stela 3 record the sacking of Pomoná in A.D. 792 and 794.  In view of the difficulties to physical movement posed by the mountain ranges in the region, and the fact that an attack on Pomoná via the Usumacinta River would have been hindered by both the San Josecito rapids and the defensive outpost of Panhalé (Anaya 2001a) it is likely then, that the attack route followed had to be an inland one, one that could have offered swift and relatively safe movement to the combined forces of Piedras Negras and La Mar. If this was the case, then a military contingent this size could have only passed to the coastal plain via the only natural entrance available between Piedras Negras and Pomoná, that meets the conditions identified above. This access is the Redención del Campesino pass. If this was the case, then uncontested control of that pass would have represented a vital asset to the kingdom of Piedras Negras, and so it is reasonable to expect to find in this valley a subsidiary center of the latter.

The first step then was to obtain, on the basis of the physical characteristics of the terrain, the plausible limits between the territories controlled by Pomoná and Piedras Negras. By estimating cost of movement over the natural terrain a GIS-based model of the territorial extent in this region of these kingdoms was generated through a location-allocation analysis (for details see Anaya 2001b). Our results indicate that at some point during the Late Classic period (ca. A.D. 600-850), this valley was indeed controlled by Piedras Negras; and by extension, Piedras Negras would have also had control of this strategic pass through a series of political alliances with the rulers of the regional secondary centers (Figure 2).

The onus was now on identifying the ideal locations within the Redención del Campesino Valley (a valley with an area of over 6000 hectares) where the likelihood of finding a locally important political/administrative center would be high. To that end a GIS model based on Dempster-Shafer Theory was developed.

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